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Copyright Protection for Computer Programs Under
the 1976 Copyright Act
On October 19, 1976 Public Law 94-553, the first complete revision of
the United States copyright law in over sixty-five years, was signed into
law.1 This new law, effective in greatest part from January 1, 1978,2 makes
fundamental changes in copyright protection by changing the basic
duration of such protection while eliminating renewals,3 and creating a
Copyright Royalty Tribunal to oversee certain new compulsory licensing
provisions.4 Additional provisions have made clarifications, if not changes.
For example, the judicially developed doctrine of fair use has been made a
part of the statute law,5 and provisions have been enacted to take account of
the effects of the vast technological changes of the past half-century on
copyright matters. 6 The extent of library liability for the widespread use of
'General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Act].
2Id. sec. 102, at 2598-99. Sections 118 (requiring compulsory licensing for certain
nonprofit use of dramatic, musical or pictorial works), 304 (b) (extending the term of
copyright protection for works in their renewal term) and ch. 8 (establishing a Copyright
Royalty Tribunal to determine rates for certain compulsory licenses) of 17 U.S.C. as amended
by the 1976 Act became effective upon approval of the Act. The remaining sections are
effective from January 1, 1978.
31976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2572-76 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. ch. 3 effective
Jan. 1, 1978). Under the 1976 Act copyright will endure for the lifetime of the author plus
fifty years. Id. at 2572. Under the old law, copyright protection lasted for twenty-eight years
from first publication and could be renewed for an additional twenty-eight years. 17 U.S.C. §
24 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
41976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2594-98 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. ch. 8).
51d. at 2546 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 107 effective Jan. 1, 1978).
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.
6See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6089.
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types
of works accorded protection . . . . [T]echnological developments have made
possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before. In some of these
cases the new expressive forms-electronic music, filmstrips, and computer pro-
grams, for example-could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject
matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered
copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation. In other cases,
such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment
was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable works.
Id. at 51, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6094.
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photocopy devices is clarified,7 and the particular problems of television
and the cable television systems are addressed.' Another area affected by the
new law, although probably not changed, is that of copyright protection
for computer programs.
Under the prior law there was some question whether a computer
program was the proper subject matter for copyright protection. While the
general opinion of the commentators 9 as well as legislative committees 0
and executive commissions" was that they were, some doubt remained.12 In
resolving this problem the 1976 Act does not single out computer programs
as a separate category of work subject to copyright protection, but the
definition of the category "literary work" is clearly broad enough to
include them. The act defines literary works entitled to copyright
protection as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards in which they are embodied."' 3
71976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2546 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 108 effective Jan. 1,
1978).
8Id. at 2542,2548-58 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 110,1 11 effective Jan. 1, 1978).
9See Banzhof, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, in ASCAP COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. No. 14, at 118 (1966); Iskrant, The Impact of the Multiple Forms of Computer
Programs on their Adequate Protection by Copyright, in ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. No. 18,
at 92 (1970); Nimmer, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and
Computers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 931 (1968); Prasinos, Worldwide Protection of Computer
Prorams by Copyright, 4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 42 (1974); Note, Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1274 (1964); Note, Adequate Protection for
Computer Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 369.
'
5 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975); note 6 supra.
"See, e.g., "To Promote the Progress of... Useful Arts", REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 13 (1966).
"2See Puckett, The Limits of Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Programs, in
ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. No. 16, at 81 (1968); Scafetta, Computer Software Protection:
The Copyright Revision Bills and Alternatives, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 381 (1975);
Note, Computer Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing Proprietory Protection Policy, 40
BROOKLYN L. REV. 116 (1973); Comment, Computer Program Protection: The Need to
Legislate a Solution, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 586 (1969).
31976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2545 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1) effective
Jan. 1, 1978). Scafetta, supra note 12, argues that computer programs could not be
legitimately copyrighted under the 1909 law. He also discusses S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), the bill which became the 1976 Act. He maintains that programs are not covered by
the act. He bases this contention upon incorrect readings of §§ 102(a) and 117 of revised 17
U.S.C. He contends that although programs designed for literary tasks may be covered, §
102(a) cannot be read to include programs generally as it does not mention them. Id. at 385.
However, the language of this section is broad enough to include programs, and the House
committee explicitly stated "[this definition] also includes computer data bases, and computer
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship .... " H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6097. Scafetta
further argues that § 117 means that the expanded definition of literary work cannot include
computer programs. Scafetta, Computer Software Protection: The Copyright Revision Bills
and Alternations, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 381, 386 (1975). But § 117 retains the
old law only in connection with computer use. It does not affect the new definition of works
entitled to copyright protection. As the committees state: "[W]ith respect to the
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As the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary points out, this
category "includes . . . computer programs to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas as
distinguished from the ideas themselves."' 4
Because the availability of copyright protection for computer programs
is now clear, this note will examine in detail the nature and scope of the
protection afforded under the 1976 Act, and will compare that protection
with that afforded by the alternatives of patent and trade secret protection.
As the act does not explicitly address itself to the particular problems of the
programming industry, the scope of its protection must be found in the
general statutory language and in relevant case law. While no case has yet
determined the scope of copyright protection afforded computer programs,
this note will show that the protection needs of the computer programmer
are analagous to those of the authors of other literary works, such as form
books and architectural plans, which also are written for use. The cases
dealing with such works will be examined to determine the scope of
protection afforded programs under the new law.
PROGRAMS
Programs are sets of instructions which set up a computer to perform
specified functions. They can be as varied as physical interconnections
within the machines 5 or literal descriptions of the steps to be followed in
performing a particular function.
To set up a computer for a specific purpose the following steps
typically are followed: (a) the desired result is specified in general terms;
(b) the method of achieving the result is specified in a description of the
steps to be followed by the machine. This product is usually called an
algorithm. It may be literal or it may take the form of a "flow chart", a
pictorial representation of the procedure; (c) the algorithm is written out in
a standard form using a human oriented programming language such as
FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation) or COBOL (COmmon Business Ori-
ented Lanugage). This product is called a source program; (d) the source
program is converted into a numerical machine language which can
interact directly with the machine. This product is called an object
copyright-ability 9f computer programs... the new statute would apply." H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6089, 6159; S.
REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1975). The actual reach of § 117 is discussed further
at note 54 infra & text accompanying.
14H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 6089, 6097. For a discussion of the distinction between an idea and the expression
of that idea, see text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
15While cards or tapes may be seen as part of the machine when they are running
through it, "physical interconnections" encompasses such devices as circuit boards which are
arranged in a particular manner, the arrangement being the program, and then plugged into
the machine.
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program; and (e) following step (c) or step (d) the program is put into
machine readable form such as magnetic or punched cards or tapes and
converted to electrical or magnetic signals stored within the computer.
16
While the product of any of these steps except the first can be called a
program, source programs and object programs are the products most
widely marketed. It is for these types of programs that copyright protection
is most needed, and it is to these specific types of programs that this note is
addressed.
ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The law provides several methods for the protection of the fruits of
intellectual labor. Principal among these are common law protection of
trade secrets 7 and the constitutional provision for patent and copyright
protection. 8 Each method affords particular protection when its peculiar
requirements are met.
Trade secret protection is a creation of common law.1 9 The trade secret
proprietor is generally protected against the disclosure or unauthorized use
of the secret by those to whom it has been confided under a restriction of
nondisclosure or nonuse.20 The protection extends even to inventions
which could have been patented,2' but is limited to material which can be
kept secret and which is not of general knowledge.22
6As a simple example consider a program to add a set of numbers. The first step would
be to specify the desired result: obtain the sum of a series of numbers. The second step would
be to construct an algorith, for example, take the first number, store it, take the second
number, add it to the first, store the sum, etc. This algorith would then be put into a
standard form, in this example in FORTRAN. Some of the steps would be: X = Y(l), which
stores a number called Y(1) in a location labeled X; X = X + Y(2), which adds a second
number, Y(2), to the contents of location X and replaces the contents of that location with the
sum; X = X + Y(3); etc. These standard form instructions would then be translated expression
for expression into a machine lanugage which can be represented by a series of binary
numbers, for example, 10110101, 01001010, 00010101, etc. These numbers, when fed into the
computer, set it up to carry out the steps specified in the programs.
Programs which allow the machine itself to perform the usually difficult task of
translation to machine language have been written for almost every computer. This note will
deal generally with programs created solely by the human programmer. The unique
problems of machine translated programs will be discussed as a special case of the legal
category of derivative works. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
"
7 See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
"8U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
ISThe common law doctrine of trade secret protection, see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
(1939), has been enacted as statutory law in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
499b (West 1970); IND. CODE §§ 35-17-3-1 to 5 (1971) (Trade Secret Theft Act of 1969) (repealed
effective July 1, 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Page 1975 Supp.). While the new
revision of the Indiana criminal law does not expressly include a section on trade secrets, its
theft provision seems broad enough to protect them. See IND. CODE § 35-43-4-3(1) (1976
Supp.).20Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (construing Ohio law);
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).2
'Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974).221d. at 475 (dictum). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964);
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Under the 1909 copyright law23 trade secret protection remained
available for works of expression which were not the proper subject of
statutory copyright.2 4 Unpublished "writings" were not protected under
the 1909 law.2 5  Thus, for these works trade secret protection remained
available. Under the 1976 Act unpublished material does come under
statutory protection,26 and the protection of such rights as the distribution
of copies by sale or rental is made the exclusive province of the federal
statute.2 7 However, breach of trust actions are expressly exempted from
statutory preemption.28 So long as the trade secret doctrine is used as a
form of contractual protection outside of the scope of the copyright law it
will not be preempted by the federal law 9
If the material is in fact kept secret a computer program can still be
protected as a trade secret. By foregoing publication, the holder of the trade
secret gains the right to prescribe conditions on both disclosure and use.
The holder of a copyright on the other hand has no control over the use of
his work but gains the right to wide distribution without loss of protection
and gains federal statutory remedies against infringers&8 0 Trade secret
protection is most appropriate for programs which can profitably be
disclosed in confidence to a few large-volume users. An example might be
a program to process bank charge accounts.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (state unfair competition
protection not available as substitute for invalid federal design patents).
2317 U.S.C. (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075 (1909) [hereinafter cited as 1909 Law]. This title of U.S.C. is revised in its entirety by the
1976 Act. See notes 1 & 2 supra & text accompanying.
24Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1972) (California law protecting against
unauthorized copying of sounds embodied in phonograph records or tapes held valid against
claim of "record pirates" that federal copyright law preempted such state protection).
-17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556 (D.
Mass. 1928). The court in Atlantic Monthly further stated that the unrestricted sale of a single
copy constitutes "publication" for the purpose of investing statutory copyright. The court
held that copyright had been voluntarily divested before the action was brought, and it could
not award the injunction requested. Hence the court's comments on publication constitute
dicta.
261976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2545 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 104(a) effective
Jan. 1, 1978).
27Id. at 2572 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 301 effective Jan. 1, 1978).
28 d. (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) effective Jan. 1, 1978).
29H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& AD. NEws 6089, 6177-78. See also S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1975)
(discussing different language in the earlier Senate version of the bill). Under the 1976 Act a
program will receive statutory protection as soon as it is written. If notice of copyright is not
properly affixed and copies are sold without restriction all protection will be lost. If copies
are not distributed publicly but are kept for in-house use no remedy will be available under
the 1976 Act if an employee disclosed the program to a competitor. However, since disclosure
of trade secrets is distinct from the protection offered by the act, a state action can be brought
against the divulging employee. Similarly, if the program is disclosed in confidence to a third
party for his use, the fact that the program is under statutory copyright as soon as it is written
does not preclude an action against such a third party if he divulges the program.
3
oSee 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-116 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
1977]
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Patent protection would be available for a program which constitutes
an invention.31  If such a program rises to the level of novelty and
nonobviousness required for patent protection,32 the ideas contained in the
program will be protected against unauthorized use-even if such use is the
result of independent discovery.33  This broad protection has led to
attempts to patent novel programs of a fundamental nature.3 4 Neither
congressional nor executive committees have looked with favor on the idea
of patent protection for computer programs.35 The two cases which have
reached the Supreme Court have held that the particular programs before
the Court could not be patented. 6 The indications are that few if any
programs would be significantly beyond the current state of the art and thus
the proper subject of patent protection."7 With copyright protection now
clearly available the courts may be even more reluctant to grant the greater
protection which a patent would provide. Even if patent protection should
prove to be available this should not bar the selection of copyright
protection.3 8
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright protects the intellectual work product which constitutes
expression as opposed to the idea which is being expressed.39 Federal
statutory copyright extends to certain writings of authors and grants to
them certain rights in their creations.40 These rights do not include the
restrictions on disclosure or use of the trade secret doctrine or the protection
against rediscovery which a. patent provides. But in the context of
computer programs, because the trade secret requirement of confidentiality
31See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). An invention can take the form of a
machine or process. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). These categories are potentially appropriate to
computer programs. A process is a "mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).32See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Novelty is not defined in the patent law. However, conditions which evidence lack of novelty
include general knowledge or use of the invention, previous patent or disclosure and previous
invention by another. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 1975). Obviousness is judged by the standard
of a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
3335 U.S.C. §§ 102, 271 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).34See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972).
s
5 See, e.g., "To Promote the Progress of ... Useful Arts," REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM (1966).36Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (nonobviousness not established); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (not a process within the meaning of the statute).
s
7See, e.g., Comment, Computer Program Protection: The Need to Legislate a Solution,
54 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 603 (1969).
"
8Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
39Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899)
(dictum).
4017 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4, 8, 10 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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may be inconvenient and the patent requirement of novelty impossible to
meet, copyright will in many cases be the only practical protection
available. An examination of the 1976 Act and court decisions in the
copyright field will determine the extent of that protection.
Copies
The basic concept of the right of the proprietor of a copyright to
restrict reproduction of his work is inherent in the word copyright itself.
This concept has been part of Anglo-American copyright law since the
Statute of Anne.41 Yet it has not been at all clear under American law, as
embodied in the 1909 law and interpreted by the courts, that this doctrine
would be of much use to the proprietor of a computer program. 42
Programs are bought to be used, and if.a useable version could be created
which was not legally a "copy," the value of the copyright in the
underlying program would be minimal.
While under the 1909 law the copyright proprietor had the exclusive
right "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work," 43
the legal meaning of these terms was established by judicial decisons. The
concept of a "copy" has been influenced greatly by the 1908 case of White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 4 White-Smith, a publisher of
sheet music, brought an infringement action against Apollo Co., the
manufacturer of perforated music rolls for use in player pianos, which
reproduced White-Smith's copyrighted sheet music. The Supreme Court
limited the definition of "a copy of a musical composition to be 'a written
or printed record of it in intelligible notation'." 45 The Court considered the
particular commercial impact of a holding of infringement on the music
publishing industry46 and the persuasive effect of unanimity in the lower
418 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
WHEREAS printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the
liberty of printing.., books and other writings, without the consent of the authors
... to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families
... may it please your Majesty... That from and after the tenth day of April, one
thousand seven hundred and ten, the author of any book or books already printed..
... shall have the sole right and liberty of printing such books and books for the
term of one and twenty years ....
421t is an interesting coincidence that in more than 250 years, British and American
copyright laws have moved separately from the Statute of Anne to remarkably similar
positions with respect to copyright protection for computer programs. The British, like the
Americans, are in the midst of a major revision of their copyright statutes. Under the present
British law, as under the old American, copyright protection is probably available for
computer programs, but as no cases have been brought the situation is uncertain. The
proposed revision of the British statute will clear up their uncertain situation. See The
Economist (London), 12-18 March 1977, at 111, col. 1.
0s17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970).
44209 U.S. 1 (1908).
451d. at 17.
46Id. at 9. There was real concern that the sheet music industry might monopolize the
mechanical music field. Apparently some eighty publishing firms had entered into contracts
with a single mechanical music organization to allow the latter the exclusive use of their
19771
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courts and held that there had been no infringement. In a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes stated that "on principle anything that
mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds [which is the essence of
the work under copyright] ought to be held a copy." 47 But he felt that the
proposition that a copy had to be perceptible by humans had been too well
established for judicial change.4 8
If the courts had restricted White-Smith to its narrow holding that a
device designed to mechanically reproduce the sounds represented by
copyrighted sheet music did not infringe the copyright in the underlying
sheet music, the case would have had little impact, for the 1909 revision of
the copyright law. specifically granted to the copyright proprietor the right
to restrict such use.49 However, in spite of the language in White-Smith
about the particular nature of the music industry and about the holdings of
the lower courts in music cases, the courts have read White-Smith to stand
for the broad proposition that something which cannot be visually
perceived as a copy of an underlying work is not a copy.50 This definition
also has been used to define the kind of "copy" necessary for publication
and registration.5 '
The potential problem for computer programmers is obvious. While
distinctions may be made between the relationship of punched cards or
magnetic tapes to the underlying program and the realtionship of a piano
roll to the underlying musical composition, such distinctions have seemed
artificial in light of the broad reading given by the courts to White-Smith.
If punched cards or magnetic tapes cannot be "copies," then they may be
freely manufactured and distributed, and any copyright in the underlying
program would be worth little. Fortunately, Congress found the distinc-
tions derived by the courts from White-Smith to be largely unjustifiable,5 2
and the language of the 1976 Act makes clear that the right to make copies
music. White-Smith was a test case brought as a part of these contracts. H.R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), reprinted in H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT Acr 194, 200-201 (1941).
Congress reacted by allowing composers to cohtrol the mechanical use of their works but
added a compulsory licensing provision to prevent the sheet music publishers from
monopolizing the recording industry. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970) (originally enacted as Pub. L.
No. 349, ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)).4 7White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 20 (1908).
48Id. at 18, 19.
49Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§
l(e), 101(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).50See, e.g., Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941).
51See Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(recordings of nursery songs were not "copies" of the underlying works and their sale held not
to constitute publication which would divest common law copyright); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (b)
(1976) (regulations for copy acceptable for registration generally require forms which can be
perceived visually).
52H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6089, 6095; S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975).
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of a work by fixing it in any material object from which the work can be
perceived either directly or with the aid of a machine of any kind is
exclusively the author's. 53 Thus, the exclusive right of the proprietor of a
copyright in a computer program to copy and vend his program in such
useable forms as punched cards and magnetic tapes is clearly secured by the
1976 Act. This important protection, previously uncertain, is alone
enough to guarantee the wide use of copyright protection for computer
programs.
The further problem of whether a program contained completely
within the electronics bf a computer is a "copy" is not decided by the 1976
Act.54 The scope of exclusive rights to the use of copyright material in
connection with computers and other similar information systems will
remain what it is under the 1909 law or state or common law. If the
temporary storage of a work in a computer does not now constitute the
making of a copy it will not be copying under the 1976 Act. The
temporary storage of a writing in the form of electrical or magnetic codes
almost certainly would not be a "copy" under the broad reading of White-
Smith, and the new provisions which override that case specifically do not
apply to this situation. This problem is perhaps more apparent than real.
To put any writing into a computer is impractical without first making a
version in a form easily read by the machine-often a copy on magnetic
tape. Such a version would itself be a copy under the 1976 Act, and the
rights of the copyright proprietor to control such copying would seem to
offer ample protection.
Use
Computer programs present an unusual, though not unique, copyright
question. To what extent does the fact that copyright protects expression
but will not create a monopoly over ideas limit the scope of copyright
protection in a writing which is designed primarily to be used rather than
read? Two areas in which this issue has been before the courts are those of
business forms and architectural plans. An examination of the cases in
these areas will help to indicate the scope of the protection that a
copyrighted computer program will receive. The leading case in the
business forms area is Baker v. Seldon.5 5 Seldon obtained a copyright on a
book which described a new bookkeeping system. The book contained
blank forms for use in implementing the system. These forms consisted of
headings and ruled lines on otherwise blank sheets. Baker published books
of forms which accomplished the same thing as those in Seldon's
531976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2541, 2546 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106
effective Jan. 1, 1978).
541d. at 2565 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 117 effective Jan. 1, 1978). See also H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089,
6161; S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1975).
55101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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copyrighted book, although Baker's arrangement of columns was different.
The court stated that "[t]he description of the art in a book, although
entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation to an exclusive
claim to the art itself." And, while Seldon may copyright his book, "that
only secures to him the exclusive right of printing and publishing his
book." They further remarked that "blank account books are not the
subject of copyright; and ... the mere copyright of Seldon's book did not
confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled
and arranged as designated by him and described and illustrated in said
book."'56 Thus Baker v. Seldon stands for the proposition that a form
designed for use which embodies an idea but not the copyrightable
expression of that idea cannot be protected by copyright.
If, on the other hand, the form inseparably includes the copyrightable
expression of the author it will be protected. Thus, when Hulbert
Beardsley obtained a copyright on a pamphlet which explained a securities
replacement bond his copyright included protection of the forms which
necessarily included the protected expression.57 The forms included such
items as a bond, affidavit of loss and an indemnity agreement. All
embodied the expression of Beardsley's plan as well as the mere idea of the
plan. The court held that such forms were entitled to copyright
protection.5 8
Even if the forms contain the protected expression of the author and are
thus protected themselves, copies may be made for personal use. The
defendant in American Institute of Architects v. Feniche159 made and used
six copies of a form contained in the Institute's copyrighted book of
"Standard Documents." The court found the use protected under the "fair
use doctrine," 6 and alternatively found that thedefendant's use was not the
kind of use intended to be forbidden by the statute. The court stated that
"when the plaintiff put on the general market a book of forms, he implied
the right to their private use." 61
The teaching of the form book cases is that while a form which does no
more than provide a tool for the use of a system or idea is not subject to
copyright protection,62 a form which inseparably contains the expression of
561d. at 107.
5 7Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816
(1958).5 1d. at 708. As to most of the forms in controversy, the court upheld the lower court's
finding that copyright had been lost through publication without compliance with statutory
requirements. Thus, much of the court's dicussion is dictum. However, as to other forms
where such a finding had not been made, the court's decision as to copyrightability rises to the
level of holding.
5941 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).60For a description of the fair use doctrine, see note 5 supra.61American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
62A caveat is in order. If the form were complicated enough so that its appearance rose to
the level of expression copyright protection would be available. However the ideas expressed
[Vol. 52:503
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
the system or idea can be protected. However, even the protected form may
be copied for personal use.63 Since the copyright proprietor loses all
control over the work once sold,64 this right of use should apply to anyone
legally in possession of a copy of the book.
A line of architectural plans cases also builds upon the basic holding of
Baker v. Seldon to protect expression but not ideas. Using a plan to build a
structure, thereby implementing and, in a sense, expressing the idea
represented by the plan, is not infringement.65 Since the plan contains the
protected expression however, it may not be freely copied.66 The limits of
this concept were laid out in Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont.67 The
court stated, "no copyrighted architectural plans . . .may clothe their
author with the exclusive right to reproduce the dwelling pictured.
However, nothing in Baker v. Seldon prevents such a copyright from
vesting the law's grant of an exclusive right to make copies of the
copyrighted plans .... "68 Thus, again it can be seen that while copyright
will not protect ideas or the right to use copyrighted material, it will
protect against the actual copying of material designed for use when the
material inseparably includes the copyrighted expression.
Baker v. Seldon and its progeny have been looked to by the courts in
other areas, 69 and the courts can be expected to look to them in deciding the
scope of protection afforded computer programs as well. A copy of a
program in a medium unsuited for use in a computer is very like a business
form bound into a form book: while it embodies the unprotected idea, it
also inseparably includes the protected expression of the author and thus is
in the form could be easily "re-expressed"-as they in fact were in Baker v. Sheldon. A form
simple enough to comprise a trivial expression of the underlying idea would receive no
protection. See discussion of minimal content, notes 76-90 infra & text accompanying.
6 SAmerican Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
'
4 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339 (1910); Blazon Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp.,
268 F. Supp. 416, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).6 Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973); De Silva
Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (alternate holding); Muller v.
Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
66Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972); Herman Frankel Org.
v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
67458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84
(6th Cir. 1967). The facts in Scholz Homes were very similar to those in Imperial Homes. The
district court in Scholz Homes had found insufficient evidence of copying to hold that
infringement had occurred. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that finding. The
circuit court cited Baker v. Seldon for the proposition that architectural plans could be freely
copied. However, as they decided the case on the issue of whether any copying had occurred,
the court expressly refused to decide if its reading of Baker v. Seldon was correct. That reading
has not been followed.
61Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972).
69See, e.g., Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 505
F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1974). The district court's opinion in this case involving an executive diary
was adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its memorandum opinion. The
opinion provides a thorough discussion of the issues which would be involved in any "use"
case.
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entitled to copyright protection. 0 The legal owner of a copy of a computer
program should be entitled to make machine readable copies for his
personal use just as the owner of a form book may make and use copies of
the forms.71 However as these copies embody the protected work as well as
the unprotected ideas and systems, their distribution to others would be
under the exclusive control of the copyright proprietor.72 Since no copy
not in machine readable form could be prepared for use, such copying
would fall under the same restriction as the copying of any other kind of
literary work and would be exclusively the right of the author, subject only
to "fair use."7 3
Other Versions
The 1909 law secured to the copyright proprietor the exclusive right to
make translations or other versions of his work. 74 The 1976 Act uses
broader language: the proprietor has the exclusive right "to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work." 75 "Derivative works"
include translations and other versions but also include "any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 76 The protection
for translations under the 1909 law and the computer industry jargon
which calls a particular programming system a "language" led to some
imaginative explanations of why a "translation" of a copyrighted program
into another system ("language") should be protected.77 While it has
always seemed clear on principle that although the ideas in a program are
not protected and can be freely re-expressed in any programming system by
anyone, line-by-line recasting of the expression of the program in a
different system of notation should not be allowed. The 1976 Act makes
clear through its derivative works section that this now is indeed the law.78
As noted in the discussion of the nature of computer programs, it is
common for a machine language object program to be created by the
computer from a source program. 79 Clearly such manufacture of a useable
program is not an infringement of copyright in the source program. 80
71See Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
816 (1958); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
"See American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
721976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2547 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 106 effective Jan.
1, 1978).
73Id. (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 107 effective Jan. 1, 1978).
7417 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975).
7-1976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2546 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) effective
Jan. 1, 1978).
76Id. at 2542 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 101 effective Jan. 1, 1978).
77See, e.g., Prasinos, supra note 9, at 69.
78See note 76 supra & text accompanying.
79See note 16 supra & text accompanying.
8OSee note 56 supra & text accompanying.
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However, it is clear that the object program is nothing but the
source program recast by the machine in a form adapted to machine use.
The programs which do this recasting follow the expression of the author
of the source program with a consistency only a machine can maintain. As
these object programs are derivative works embodying the expression of the
author of the source program, their manufacture for anything but personal
use would be the exclusive right of the proprietor of the copyright in the
source program. While a second programmer is free to read a program and
recast its ideas in his own expression,8' neither he nor a machine is free
merely to transliterate the expression of the original author into a new
notation.
It is common practice in the computer industry to use programs as
subparts ("subprograms") of larger programs. The use doctrine would
allow a purchaser to use a program as such a subpart of his own programs
for personal use.82 However, just as a copyrighted work may not be used as
part of another work without leave of the copyright holder,88 a second
programmer could not without license use the copyrighted work of another
in a work of his own offered to third parties.8 4 Since abridgements and
condensations are protected as derivative works, the use of subparts or
sections of a protected program in derivative works would again require the
license of the copyright proprietor.85
Minimal Content: A Limit on Copyright Protection
Even the expression of an author cannot receive copyright protection if
it is so minimal that it does no more than give basic expression to an idea.8 6
The courts have held that one may employ the same phraseology used in a
similar copyrighted work if the topic necessarily requires it7 and that if
"This doctrine often arises in cases involving literary works with similar plots. The
courts have held that copyright does not protect plots at the level of their general theme or
skeleton. See, e.g., Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931). In addition to a discussion of plot, Judge Hand's opinion in Nichols
contains an interesting discussion of the use of standard ethnic characters and criticism of the
overuse of expert testimony.
82See note 57 supra & text accompanying.
8 Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (book of
answers to problems in plaintiff's textbooks held infringement when recognizable versions of
the copyrighted problems were used in the answer books).
84See 1976 Act, supra note 1, sec. 101, at 2546 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. § 106 effective
Jan. 1, 1978).
95d.
86The argument is forcefully expressed in an alternate holding in Crume v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944). The court stated that "to hold that an idea, plan,
method or art described in a copyright is open to the public but that it can be used only by the
employment of different words and phrases which mean the same thing, borders on the
preposterous." Id. at 184-85.87Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539 (1st Cir. 1905) (city
directory).
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only a limited number of expressions are available to express an idea none
may be copyrighted.18 This doctrine has prevented protection under the
copyright law of such diverse items as contest rules 9 and a pin in the form
of a jeweled bee.90
This doctrine precludes any copyright protection for short programs
which represent only isolated ideas. For example, a program designed
merely to add a string of numbers would only embody the idea or concept
of addition and would not be the proper subject matter for copyright
protection no matter how elegantly the idea was expressed. However, the
programmer-author of a large program which allows greater variation in
expression can receive copyright protection for that expression.
CONCLUSION
The general revision of the copyright law carried out in Public Law 94-
553 has clarified the protection available for computer programs under the
copyright law. Such programs are clearly a proper subject matter for
copyright, and, with the spectre of White-Smith v. Apollo laid to rest, the
available protection will become meaningful. Subject to the fair use
doctrine the programmer-author has the exclusive right to copy his
program and to adapt all or parts of it in other programs or "languages."
As this note has demonstrated, this protection is very closely analogous to
that given business forms and architectural plans which include the
expression under copyright, and the range of cases which have discussed
those problems is broad enough so that widespread use of copyright to
protect programs should produce no truly novel problems of judicial
interpretation. This broad and certain protection combined with the
reluctance of the courts to allow patent protection to programs should lead
to the wide acceptance of copyright as the protection of choice for
computer programs.*
Louis PETER PATAKI, JR.
88Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). Morrisey's copyrighted
sweepstakes rule involving box tops and social security numbers was copied almost verbatim
by Proctor 9c Gamble. The court held that copyright protection did not extend to the rule
because of its simplicity and straightforward nature. Id. at 679.
89Id.
90Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
* A slightly different version of this note has been entered in the Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition.
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